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On August ™ 9 T985, the U.S. District Court
for the Western H*strict of Pennsylvania in
United States v.Westlnghguse Electric
Corporation, DCWPA Mo. 11710, held that the
Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD
IG) could subpoena internal audit reports
from Westinghouse Electric Corporation and
could authorize the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) to review those reports as part
of the DOD IG's investigation. Although
Westinghouse subsequently obtained a stay of
the district court order, pending appeal to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the case
will certainly encourage DCAA to increase its
demands for contractors',management data,
pursuant to its new found independent sub
poena authority.
DCAA, as the largest auditing agency in the
Department of Defense, under pressure from
Congress and the DOD IG, has recently
expanded its efforts to obtain contractor
records. This is due to certain perceived
weaknesses in the access by DCAA to records,
DCAA's handling of suspected fraud and the
adequacy of the internal audit controls of
corporations subject to audit.
In a January 31, 1985, memo to DCAA Director
Charles O'Starrett, Jr., DOD Comptroller
Robert W. Helm outlined the seven elements of
a proposal being considered to improve the
effectiveness of DCAA. These elements
include:
1.

2.

Obtaining subpoena authority for DCAA.
DCAA at that time relied upon the DOD IG
subpoena authority to obtain records
otherwise unobtainable from con
tractors. Now, DCAA has independent
subpoena authority.^

3.

Clarification and strengthening of the
role of DCAA as primary advisor to the
contracting officer on accounting and
financial matters. This^would include
increasing the auditor's participation
in negotiations.

4.

Increasing the frequency and breadth of
DCAA's audits of defective pricing.

5.

Assessing audit coverage of labor and
fringe benefits of major contractors.

6.

Strengthening management by headquarters
DCAA and regional headquarters of field
activities and operations. This would
include analyzing reporting needs of
management levels within DCAA and eval
uating the effectiveness of existing
peer review programs.

7.

Improving reporting by DCAA to the
comptroller.

A further indication of an expansionist DCAA
role is seen in Deputy Defense Secretary
William H. Taft's granting the audit agency
responsibility for determining final overhead
rates at all defense contractor locations.
In an August 5, 1985, memo to Assistant
Secretary of Defense Acquisition and
Logistics James Wade and Comptroller Robert
Helm, Taft extended the procedures used by
DCAA to determine final overhead rates at
smaller contractors to the larger contractor

Identification of needed regulatory and
statutory changes regarding records
retention and access to records that
would improve accomplishment of the
contract audit mission. This would
broaden the current definition of
records to include computerized and
other types of data and revising DOD
record retention rules.
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locations where final overhead rates had
traditionally been established through pro
curement negotiation by administrative con
tracting officers (AGO).

allocability of the internal audit costs
incurred and allocated to government con
tracts by Westinghouse. The two memoranda
stated further that the internal audit
reports, "are needed for audit reviews which
include in their objectives and the promotion
of economy and efficiency in the prevention
of fraud and abuse ..." (SIC). 3

Since the spring of 1984, DCAA has pushed for
access to additional contractor records
including profit plans, management studies,
accounts unrelated to expenditures on govern
ment contracts, and other data previously
considered off-limits. The current objec
tive, however, is internal audit reports.

On September 27, 1984, the DOD IG issued a
subpoena to Westinghouse for records pertain
ing to internal audits for the period of
January 1, 1982, through October 1, 1984, for
which costs had been incurred by Westinghouse
and had been allocated to defense contracts
and subcontracts. The subpoena limited the
demand for production of documents to those
records "... which are necessary in the
performance of the responsibility of the
Inspector General under the Inspector General
Act to conduct and supervise audits and
investigations relating to, and to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration of, and to prevent and detect
fraud and abuse in, the programs and opera
tions of the Department of Defense."^
Westinghouse refused to comply with the
subpoena.

DCAA asserts it has a right to these internal
cost records based on statute, contract
clauses and accounting standards. If the
contractor refuses to produce the desired
internal cost records, DCAA has threatened to
suspend all costs of the corporation's
Internal Audit Department, to recommend to
the ACO suspension of the corporation's
Internal Audit Department costs which are
included in any progress payment requests, to
report the lack of cooperation to the
Procurement Contracting Officer fPCO) for use
in negotiating the contractor's future profit
or fee, and, to question the allowability of
other costs based on the alleged impact of
the acceptability of the company's accounting
system.^

On December 27, 1984, the DOD IG filed a
Petition for Enforcement of Administrative
Subpoena by the Government^ which was
granted by the District Court'on August 4,
1985. In addition to briefs filed by the
government and Westinghouse, the Chamber of
Commerce and the Institute of Internal
Auditors filed amicus curiae briefs in
support of Westinghouse's position.

In connection with these efforts, DCAA sought
independent subpoena power for those cases
where a contractor denied it access to
records. Previously, DCAA, as it did in the
Westinghouse case, had to go to the DOD IG in
order to obtain a subpoena.
The Westinghouse Case Background

The Contractor's Position and The Court's
Response

The litigation resulting in Westinghouse
arose as a result of DCAA's demands to perform an operational audit of Westinghouse*s
internal audit department and to obtain
access to the company's internal audit
reports. Westinghouse declined to provide
access to the information DCAA sought
because, it contended, the internal audit
reports did not reflect the incurrence and
allocation of cost. Westinghouse also argued
that such an audit was not authorized by the
audit clauses of the contract.

Westinghouse raised a number of arguments
directed at the propriety of the subpoena.
First, Westinghouse argued that since DCAA
did not have subpoena power, the DOD IG was
illegally acting on its behalf. The court
rejected this argument, finding that the DOD
IG was acting on its own behalf and was
merely using the DCAA as its delivery agent.
The court also rejected Westinghouse's
argument that the DOD IG's authority to
access data was limited by the standards set
for the GAO. The court noted that the
subpoena power granted to the DOD IG by
congress was greater in scope than the
examination of records authority granted to
the General Accounting Office."

In two memoranda dated August 14 and August
16, 1984, nCAA requested that the DOD IG
issue a subpoena for all documents generated
by the Westinghouse internal audit department
relating to any of the organizational ele
ments which allocate costs to DOD contracts.
The August 16 memo stated that the
Westinghouse internal audit reports were
needed in order to allow DCAA to reach an
opinion on the reasonableness and

Westinghouse contended next that the sub
poena was too broad, and that disclosure of
audit reports would compromise confidential
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data unrelated to its defense business. The
court found that since: (i) Westinghouse
released its internal audit reports to its
independent certified public accountants,
(ii) these CPA's discharge a "public respon
sibility", and (iii) similarly the DOD IG
also performed a public responsibility, the
DOD IG should be given the same access to the
reports. The national policy of preventing
waste, fraud and abuse in government con
tracts, the court noted, outweighed any
"chilling effect" on the ability of the
contractors' internal auditors to perform
their official duties. 7
Since Westinghouse, for the purposes of per
forming its internal audits, combined funds
attributable to government contracts with
those of its commercial contracts, the court
further held the contractor could not effec
tively use this situation to deny the DOD IG
access to these reports. If Westinghouse had
kept separate records of its government con
tract business and its related internal audit
operations, it might have persuaded the court
that the DOD IG could not intrude upon its
corporate reports. Moreover, the court noted
Westinghouse was paid in excess of $500,000
in 1983 for audit costs, and thus "sold its
right to secrecy and opened the door to the
government and its right to inspect the
internal audit . . . reports." 8
Finally, the court rejected the notion that
compliance with the subpoena would be unduly
burdensome. Noting that in U.S. v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company,^ the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia upheld a
government subpoena, despite a claim that it
would require 100,000 hours or more than $2
million to comply, the court observed that
the subpoena in the instant case had not been
shown to be unreasonble or unduly burden
some. 10
Impact of Decision
Unless the District Court decision in the
Westinghouse case is reversed or modified
through judicial appeal, executive regula
tion, or congressional enactment, ft would
appear that there will be nothing to pre
vent either DCAA or the DOD IG access to
contractor records, where only "indirect"
cost allocation—costs which are not the
subject matter of the internal audit report
(or other management document)—is the sole
existing factor. If DCAA is granted the
right of access to any one type of internal
management record (i.e. internal audit
department reports)—to determine the
reasonableness and allocability of the costs
incurred by the organizational unit
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generating the particular type of record—
DCAA would have, by simple analogy and logic,
the right to demand access to all other
internal management records where any portion
of the costs for generating such records is
allocated to government contracts. Keep in
mind only a small fraction of their costs
might be allocated to government contracts
since the costs of generating internal
management records for either commercial or
government contracts find their way into an
indirect cost pool, which is then allocated
to individual contracts. Thus, DCAA could
claim a right to obtain virtually every
report, planning and decision document and
working paper a company generates. 1 ' This,
however, should not be the case.
First, it is well established in the "Rights
in Data" area that indirect costs, such as
independent research and development (IR&D)
expenditures, although indirectly reimbursed
by the government through overhead rates, are
nevertheless considered private expen
ditures. 1 ^ Accordingly, the government
acquires no rights in any invention, process,
etc. resulting from IR&D effort even though
it is indirectly and partially reimbursed by
the government through the contractor's
indirect costs. By analogy, therefore, the
government should have no right to internal
audits, even though indirectly reimbursed by
the government, since they should also be
considered private expenditures.
Second, is audit access, through reimburse
ment of indirect costs, absolute or a matter
of degree based on a quantum theory and
analysis? In Westinghouse, the court found
that since the government had paid in excess
of $500,000 for internal audits done by
Westinghouse, the government in effect
"owned" those internal audit reports. If the
amount allocated to internal audits was,
however, only a de minimus amount, would the
government still have unlimited access? If
the government is entitled to access through
the mere indirect payment of $1.00, it may be
necessary for contractors—as a defense
against internal audit report access—to (i)
allocate internal audit costs to the indirect
pools (per the established accounting system)
and then (ii) remove the allocable amount
from the pool when seeking cost reimburse
ment. The same principle would have to be
applied to forward pricing rate agreements to
ensure that firm fixed contracts are purged
of such costs. Only procurements based on
price analysis (not cost analysis) would
conceivably escape such treatment. In this
way, contractors could then argue that the
government has not acquired any right in

government reimbursement of an indirect cost
in and of itself a sufficient basis to give
it a right to access documents, records, etc.
associated with that indirect cost-generating
function? In addressing this question in
whatever forum (legislative, judicial or
executive), the ultimate answer--!f it
sustains the district court's premise--could
have a very significant adverse impact on the
private sector/government relationship.
Those companies infused with a dynamic,
entrepreneurial management with an election
to focus on the commercial marketplace may
conclude that government business is not
worth the price of such government access and
intrusion into affairs of little, if any,
direct bearing on government contracted
work. As a policy, the "best and the
brightest" should be attracted, not repelled,
to solving the government's procurement
needs. 15

those internal audit reports since the con
tractor has specifically excluded payment for
those costs,
A third question that arises is whether any
commingling of commercial and government
accounts justifies government access to all
commercial as well as government data. If
there are any internal audit reports which
include Information from government contracts
•Which are subsequently made part of the total
corporate audit, does that constitute suf
ficient "commingling* to allow the government
complete access* to all corporate records? If
it does, contractors must clearly segregate
all government accounts and take other, steps
"
necessary to protect commercial
Finally , the Hestlndhouste court's determina
tion that tiie^ifjx>^r~yts Issued for a
legitimate purpose wftliii the scope of the
DOD IS 1 s authority, Mkes It questionable
whether DCM now needs Its own subpoena
power* The court ftund that at the time of
the Issuance of the subpoena, the DOD 16 had
personal interest , official curlosl ty , and
suspicion that ifesti nghouse !| s refusal to
produce the Internal audits, plus other
surroun d if circumstances required an Inves- ti gia.fi on to- <H scharge the 16 ' s respons 1b 1 1 1 ties' to the DOD and the public.- The court
also recognized that the 16 had Independently
determined that there was a need! for the
subpoena and was Issuing the subpoena for Its
own purposes and not purely for the DCAA.
Even though the. recently enacted DCAA
subpoena, authority Is less extensive than the
DOD' I6's, this review level, however limited
it vty.be, is eliminated,' 1* DCAA has carte
blanche authority1 to inspect a contractor's
'records.
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Conclusion
testl nghouse decision is no doubt the
first chapter of 'What will be a long-running
"access to records" drama. There will be
greater insight when the appellate process
has been exhausted by the litigants. Since
DCAA has received its own statutory subpoena
power, and therefore the "procedural" ques
tions springing out of the DOD IG/DCAA reiatlonshlp in Westi nghouse may be of little
future significance, the extent of that
subpoena authority is of great importance.
It is the "substantive" questions raised by
Westi nghouse and noted above that have an
ominous portent. Most notably, either
appellate court review, executive branch
regulation, and/ or congressional oversight
must ultimately address the fundamental
proposition posed by Westinghouse: Is
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^Defense Procurement Circular No. 22
(29 Jan. 1965).

Department of Defense Fiscal
Year 1986 Authorization Act (P.I. 99-""45)
Subpoena of Defense Contractor Records
amended Section 2313 of Title 10, United
States Code by adding
"(dKi) the Director of the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (or any successor
agency) may require by subpoena the produc
tion of books, documents, papers, or records
of a contractor, access to which is provided
to the Secretary of Defense by subsection
(a) or by section 2306m of this title."

13See, "Confronting the DOD "Access
to Records" Offensive" by C. Kipps, J.
Carl son and A. Rrown, 43 Federal Contracts
Report, June 3, 1985, at 1032, for an
analysis on how contractors should protect
records.
subpoena authority amended
10 U.S.C. 2313 to grant DCAA the right to
require production of those books, docu
ments, papers or records of a contractor
which DCAA has a right to review pursuant to
23l3fa) and 10 U.S.C. 2306m. Section
2313fb) provides that the examination of
records would involve records that directly
pertain to and involve transactions relating
to the contract. This is much more limited
than the DOD IG : s subpoena power set forth
in the Inspector General Act of 1978, as
amended. 5 U.S.C. Appendix 56(a)(4) and 28
U.S.C. 1345.

?See, "Has DCAA overstepped its
authority under the audit clause?" by W.
Adams and J. Gallagher, Contract Management,
November, 1984, at 17.
3u.S. v Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, Nisc. So. n/io, slip op. at 11
(W.D. PA, Aug. 14, 1985K

d :u, at 2.
F I<rt, at 2.

December il, 1985, DCAA issued a
new regulation governing the process of
subpoenaing defense contractor records,
implementing the provisions of Pub. L,
99-145. The regulation outlines that the
DCAA director is responsible for issuing
subpoenas and for providing the Secretary of
Defense an annual report on the use of the
subpoena authority. Pursuant to the regula
tion, the DCAA general counsel is tasked
with reviewing subpoena requests to make
sure they are legal and with notifying the
Justice Department if the subpoena needs to
be enforced.

6 In Powsher v. Merck & Company, Inc.,
460 U.S. 8Z4 (1983), a divided Supreme Court
ruled that the federal access to records
statutes generally don't authorize the
General Accounting Office to examine con
tractor's indirect cost records. The court
allowed that contractors could withhold
records concerning research and development
and other indirect costs, except to the
extent that these costs are identified with
a particular government contract.
^Westinghouse at 55.
8 Idl, at 56.
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9455 F. Supp. 1072 fD.C.D.C. 1978).

10Westinghouse at 48-49. "The
respondent states that compliance with the
subpoena would require approximately 3700
hours of effort and $55,000 in direct repro
duction costs (a!though the government has
not required that the documents be copied,
only made available for inspection), in
order to produce the 920 internal audit
reports that relate to DOD contracts . . .
I find that the subpoena in the instant case
has not been shown to be unreasonable or
unduly burdensome."
11 ^ee Machinery and Allied
Products Institute Bulletin No. W598, August
zi, 1985, where the same conclusion is
advanced.
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